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In Manhattan and elsewhere, housing prices have soared over the 1990s. Rising incomes, lower
interest rates, and other factors can explain the demand side of this increase, but some sluggishness
on the supply of apartment buildings also is needed to account for the high and rising prices. In a
market dominated by high rises, the marginal cost of supplying more space is reflected in the cost
of adding an extra floor to any new building. Home building is a highly competitive industry with
almost no natural barriers to entry, yet prices in Manhattan currently appear to be more than twice
their supply costs. We argue that land use restrictions are the natural explanation of this gap. We
also present evidence consistent with our hypothesis that regulation is constraining the supply of
housing so that increased demand leads to much higher prices, not many more units, in a number
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I.  Introduction 
 
 
In some of America’s great cities, residential real estate prices have soared over the past 
twenty years.  In Boston and San Francisco, the median home price rose by 153 and 81 
percent, respectively, in constant dollars between 1980 and 2000.  According to the U.S. 
Census, the median value of an owner-occupied housing unit in Manhattan rose from 
$245,633 in 1980 to $377,246 in 2000 (both figures in 2002 dollars), implying an average 
annual compounded real appreciation rate of 2.2 percent, which is double the national 
average real appreciation rate on the widely-used Freddie Mac Repeat Sales Price Index.  
Rising incomes and declining interest rates almost certainly have increased the 
willingness to pay for proximity to productivity and amenities.  The buoyant financial 
sector, which thrives on the information flows facilitated by New York’s high density, 
has pushed New York’s real per capita income from $26,730 to $46,349 between 1979 
and 1999 (again both figures in 2002 dollars).
1   
 
New York’s high wages and attractive amenities make the demand for its space 
understandable, but increases in the demand for housing need not always create such 
large price increases.  In many places, the supply of housing seems almost perfectly 
elastic.  For example, the population of Las Vegas almost tripled between 1980 and 2000, 
but the real median housing price did not change.  In fact, real median housing prices fell 
in more than one-third of the larger American cities that added housing units at the 
national rate or faster since 1980.  In the sprawling cities of the American heartland, land 
remains cheap, real construction costs are falling, and expanding supply keeps housing 
prices down.   
 
Even in New York City, housing supply used to help keep prices down.  As New York 
grew in earlier decades, existing blocks of apartments and homes were demolished to 
make way for denser residences.  Figure 1, which plots data back to the 1950s, shows that 
                                                 
1 In 2002, 40 percent of the wage payroll in Manhattan was generated by the financial sector, broadly 
defined.     3
such rapid price growth has not always been the norm.
2  During this earlier period, tens of 
thousands of new units were built in Manhattan, and prices stayed flat.  There were 
13,000 new units permitted in Manhattan in 1960 alone, versus only 21,000 new units 
permitted in Manhattan throughout the 1990s.  Since 1980 and in spite of skyrocketing 
prices, the housing stock of each of the three cities noted above has grown by less than 10 
percent.   
 
In this paper, we try to make the case that the limited supply response is not the result of 
technological constraints, or imperfect competition in the construction industry, but rather 
the consequence of an increasingly restrictive regulatory environment.  In Manhattan and 
in other parts of the country, local homeowners have become more and more competent 
in blocking new development which they presumably oppose because the new 
development would reduce the value of their property either because of increased supply 
or because of congestion-related externalities.  For reasons discussed just below our focus 
is on New York City and Manhattan in particular, but we also present evidence for 21 
major metropolitan areas across the country.  
 
The prevailing methodology for assessing the impact of government regulation on 
housing price is to compare housing prices in places with some observable form of 
regulation with prices in places without that form of regulation.  Katz and Rosen (1987) 
provided one of the very first and best known such estimates, concluding that house 
prices were from 20-40 percent higher in San Francisco area communities that had 
enacted growth moratoria or imposed growth management control plans in the 1980s.
3  
This work is compelling, but more widespread analysis of this type is very difficult to 
undertake because much regulation of the housing market is extremely challenging to 
quantify.  The opponents of development have a strikingly diverse array of weapons, 
                                                 
2 The price data plotted in Figure 1 are for the metropolitan area as a whole.  See the notes to the figure for 
the details.   
3 Speyer (1989) and Pollakowski and Wachter (1990) followed with confirmation of significant 
capitalization in two other metropolitan areas.  There is also an extensive literature on zoning that is related 
to our research, as one way to restrict development is via zoning.  The interested reader should see Fischel 
(1985) for an excellent review of that area and Hamilton (1978) for an early empirical study linking zoning 
restrictions to high house prices.   4
ranging from environmental law suits to public demonstrations which extend far from the 
official rules that are supposed to influence the amount of construction. 
 
Consequently, we adopt a different approach that depends much more on basic 
economics.  One of the strongest implications of free markets is that in an open, 
competitive, unregulated market, the price of a commodity will not be greater than the 
marginal cost of producing that good.   Construction is an enormously competitive 
industry, with more than 130,000 establishments nationwide and more than 1,000 
establishments in multifamily construction in New York State alone.  Free competition 
among these suppliers should ensure that prices are pushed down to marginal cost, so the 
presence of a large gap between market values and marginal production costs indicates 
the presence of supply-side restrictions.
4   If we are confident that we are not missing any 
technological barriers to construction, then the gap between market value and the cost of 
supply must reflect the impact of government regulation.   
 
This approach has two obvious problems.  First, our evidence is indirect, and we cannot 
measure the price impact of any specific policy.  Different types of zoning restrictions or 
growth controls certainly could have different effects in the market.   Second, unless we 
are confident that our cost numbers fully capture the marginal cost of housing and that 
the construction industry is perfectly competitive, our estimates will overestimate the 
impact of regulation either because of omitted costs or because we are mistaking 
monopoly power for government-created barriers to entry.  We will address these 
concerns by providing auxiliary information on the impact of zoning and other supply-
side restrictions and by interpreting only very large gaps between prices and production 
costs as evidence for government regulation.                     
 
This suggests that the key task in our approach is to estimate the marginal cost of 
producing a house.  In the case of single-family homes, this combines the cost of building 
the structure and the cost of buying and preparing the land.  In the case of multifamily   5
apartments, the marginal cost of a unit is the cost of expanding a new project upwards.  
Land shortages well may limit certain types of development in Manhattan, but builders 
always can add an extra floor if that would be profitable.  Thus, to understand the 
marginal physical cost of building a new apartment we do not need to consider land 
purchase or preparation costs, as these are fixed costs which do not influence the 
marginal cost of building up.  This is the primary reason why we focus on Manhattan, as 
we are much more confident of the quality of the cost data in such a market. 
 
Different data sources provide a range of estimates, from $120-$220 per square foot, for 
the physical costs of different types of residential building construction in Manhattan.  
These figures are meant to capture the purely physical costs of construction and do not 
include the potentially very large costs associated with assembling a site for construction.  
Still, we believe that a figure from the upper end of this range is a reasonable estimate for 
providing more space if the builder were legally allowed to build up.   
 
The data clearly show that market prices in Manhattan have been at least double this 
marginal cost of production for many years.  In the most recent years, Manhattan 
condominiums have been selling for $600 per square foot, which is triple the marginal 
cost of building up.  This gap is so large that it is hard to believe that measurement error 
in building costs could be responsible for the difference in any meaningful way.
5   If it 
costs $200 per square foot to build an apartment that sells for $600 per square foot, then 
this would seem to offer an irresistible arbitrage opportunity for developers.  The best 
explanation for why they do not take advantage of this opportunity is the reason they tell 
us themselves: New York’s maze of building regulations effectively cap their building 
heights.   
 
To support our contention that the price/cost is the result of regulation, not some other 
force, we present other evidence on the New York housing market.  First, we present a 
                                                                                                                                                 
4 There are exceptions to this, of course, including the mark-ups that can occur when monopoly power is 
present.  We discuss this issue more fully below where we show it is not relevant to the home building 
industry.   6
brief synopsis of “The Battle of Carnegie Hill,” a classic case where local homeowners 
used the regulatory process to halve the height of a new building.  Second, we present 
data on permitting activity, which also supports our contention that changes in the 
regulatory environment help us to understand why Manhattan prices have skyrocketed. 
 
We then ask whether other markets exhibit similarly large gaps between the price of 
housing and the marginal cost of producing that housing.  Given the rise of the so-called 
Smart Growth movement in particular and environmental sensitivities more generally, 
providing a broader geographic perspective is a useful exercise.
6  We report results for 
the 21 metropolitan areas tracked in the 1998-99 special Metropolitan files of the 
American Housing Survey (AHS).
7  In twelve out of the twenty-one markets that we 
examine, the typical home costs no more than 110 percent of the combined costs of the 
physical structure and the land.  However, in the Boston, New York City, Newport News, 
Salt Lake City and Washington, D.C. metropolitan areas, the gap between construction 
costs and home prices is between ten and thirty-three percent.  In the Los Angeles, 
Oakland, San Francisco, and San Jose areas, the gap is from one-third to one-half of 
typical house value.  Given that California is well-known as the epicenter of the 
restrictions on new construction, we found it gratifying that our measures suggested that 
California had the highest “regulatory tax.”   
 
Because the underlying data are for single family homes, we must estimate the price of 
land as part of the marginal cost of the housing unit.  As we discuss later in the paper, 
there are a number of potential biases arising from the fact that there is insufficient data 
on existing land sales with which to estimate the cost of a standard unit of land in a 
straightforward manner.  While the precise extent of bias is not known, we have made 
every attempt to be conservative in estimating the gap between house values and 
marginal production costs.  While these results are inherently less robust than those we 
report for Manhattan because of the difficulties in estimating land price, the evidence still  
                                                                                                                                                 
5 The unit prices are from actual sales so there is not even the normal worry about biases from self-
reporting by owners for those data. 
6 The term Smart Growth typically refers to a variety of policies intended to deal with sprawl and other 
emerging points of debate and contention relating to the modern urban landscape.     7
strongly suggests that prices exceed construction costs in many coastal housing markets, 
and by a fairly wide amount (if not by the precise numbers we report below in Table 6).  
To further investigate whether these measures reflect regulation or some other factor, we 
then correlate our regulatory tax estimates with other measures of zoning toughness.  We 
find a significant positive correlation, indicating that places with larger gaps between 
market prices and production costs have more onerous zoning rules.      
 
Finally, we ask whether the existing restrictions on new construction could be socially 
optimal.  After all, since the value of owner-occupied housing used as primary residences 
is $9.4 trillion according to the 1998 Survey of Consumer Finances, the social welfare 
losses due to inefficient regulation may be considerable.  While welfare analyses of 
building restrictions are notoriously difficult to implement, the exercise is more 
straightforward in Manhattan because changes in density are unlikely to create large 
changes in the nature of the community.  Our examination does not find any negative 
externality (or combination of externalities) even remotely large enough to warrant a 
development tax that leaves market prices as least double construction costs. 
  
If we are right, and the building restrictions in New York have created this housing price 
boom, it is worth asking what the social losses are from these high prices.  After all, the 
new residents are presumably being compensated for these high prices with higher wages 
and amenities.  Old residents are benefiting from being able to sell their homes at 
extraordinary profits.  If government regulation is excessive, the social losses are in the 
underpopulation of high productivity, high amenity places.  In short, if our estimates are 
to be believed, then Manhattan is underpopulated.  Likewise, high zoning taxes mean that 
many of the attractive areas in California have too few people relative to the social 
optimum.  The social costs of binding development restrictions lie in the misallocation of 
consumers, and having them live in less productive, less attractive places.   
 
The plan of the paper is as follows.  The next section discusses the gap between housing 
prices and construction costs in Manhattan.  Section III then presents other evidence on 
                                                                                                                                                 
7 This work closely follows Glaeser and Gyourko (2002).     8
regulation in the Manhattan market.  This is followed in Section IV with the 21 
metropolitan area analysis using the American Housing Survey.  Section V describes our 
welfare analysis, and the paper concludes with a brief summary. 
 
II.  The Gap Between Prices and Production Costs in New York 
 
Our primary empirical strategy is to measure the gap between real estate prices and 
housing production costs, and use that differential to measure the distortions in the 
housing market.
8  We will use the term “Regulatory Tax”
 to reflect the increase in costs 
imposed by regulatory restrictions which themselves could include quantity controls, 
myriad zoning rules, or taxes and fees.  As such, we will define the tax as: 
 
(1) Regulatory Tax = Market Price of a Housing Unit –  
Marginal Cost of that Unit (absent government barriers)  
 
This definition suggests two potential problems for accurate measurement.  First, the 
marginal cost of a unit absent government barriers may be hard to measure.  Second, 
even if we do measure this marginal cost correctly, there may be other reasons for a gap 
between price and marginal cost other than regulation (e.g., monopoly power of 
suppliers).  A separate issue is if new construction generates negative externalities, then 
the optimal Regulatory Tax is positive.  We will return to this point at the end of the 
paper, but at this point, we are trying to measure the regulatory tax, not inferring anything 
about its optimality.     
 
The issues surrounding cost measurement are very different for single-family dwellings 
and large apartment buildings.  In both cases, one component of cost is the physical cost 
of construction, and we can fairly accurately assess the physical costs of construction 
using sources such as the R.S. Means Company data.  Their data include material costs 
                                                 
8 Of course, as Glaeser and Gyourko (2003) emphasize, there is no reason why housing prices cannot fall 
below construction costs in declining areas.  In those places, there will be no new building in the market.     9
and labor costs, but not costs associated with land.
9  For apartment buildings in which the 
marginal cost of a new housing unit is entirely reflected in the cost of building up (absent 
government intervention), we can readily estimate the marginal cost of the unit with 
construction cost data.  In the case of single-family dwellings, we must also estimate the 
cost of land, also absent government intervention.  Data on existing land sales with which 
to estimate land costs is very sparse, so we must use housing price hedonics to estimate 
the how much current homeowners “value” their own land.  While we will turn to this 
approach for single-family homes in Section IV, the usual questions about hedonic 
estimates lead us to focus initially on multi-family dwellings which are free from this 
problem.   
 
The second potential problem with our regulatory tax definition is that a gap between 
prices and costs can arise for reasons other than government regulation, particularly if 
some firms have market power that they can exploit.   However, all available evidence 
suggests that the housing production industry is highly competitive, with no natural 
barriers to entry.  The 1997 Economic Census reports that there were 138,850 
establishments in the business of constructing single-family homes.  While there are a 
huge number of small, ‘mom and pop’-type operations, there also are more than 1,700 
establishments with revenues in excess of $10 million.  The multifamily housing industry 
is only slightly less concentrated.  In 1997, there were 7,544 establishments in this 
industry and more than 1,000 in New York state alone.  In the absence of some type of 
land use controls, it is hard to doubt that residential construction would come as close as 
possible to the economic ideal of a perfectly competitive industry. 
 
Given that Manhattan is an island, one is naturally tempted to wonder if a fundamental 
scarcity of buildable space has developed over time that, when coupled with strong recent 
demand, is responsible for today’s high prices.  However, even if vacant land is rare, new 
units could be supplied by ‘building up’.  Given the difficulties of accurately estimating 
the value of land, this makes Manhattan, a market dominated by multi-story residential 
                                                 
9 Two publications are particularly relevant for greater detail on the underlying data:  Residential Cost 
Data, 19
th annual edition, (2000) and Square Foot Costs, 21
st annual edition (2000), both published by the   10
buildings, a natural application for our analysis.  Because additional land is not required 
on the margin, the production costs of an extra housing unit in this market can be well 
approximated by the physical costs of adding an extra floor of space.  As the appendix 
shows, much of the new construction in Manhattan in recent times has occurred at 
moderate building heights that could have easily been extended.  Land shortages may 
limit certain types of development in Manhattan, but builders always can add one extra 
story if new housing units are needed.      
 
Another potential source of distortions in the New York City housing market is rent 
control.
10  In some cases, rent control may limit the ability to tear down existing renter-
occupied buildings.  Nonetheless, this should still reflect a fixed cost that does not change 
the marginal cost of constructing an extra apartment in a new development.   
 
Just How Expensive is Manhattan Real Estate? 
 
Our primary data on prices comes from condominium sales records in Manhattan from 
the First American Real Estate Corporation.  These originate from deeds records and 
represent actual transactions prices over the period 1984 to 2002.  All sales prices 
reported in this section are converted into 2002 dollars using the Consumer Price Index.  
And, as our construction cost data are generally on a per square foot basis, we will also 
convert our price data into per square foot measures.     
 
We have a large sample of 23,060 condominiums spread throughout Manhattan.  While 
there is considerable variation in the data, the basic numbers suggest that Manhattan 
                                                                                                                                                 
R.S. Means Company. 
10 Rent control is the most widely-studied housing regulation.  The rent control literature is a lengthy one 
that has built on Friedman and Stigler’s (1946) classic analysis (reprinted in Bloch and Olsen (1981)).  De 
Salvo (1971) and Olsen (1972) produced the first modern, econometric analyses of New York City’s 
control regime, with Rydell, et. al. studying Los Angeles’ foray into controls.   Linneman (1987) and 
Gyourko and Linneman (1989, 1990) followed with investigations of various equity and efficiency aspects 
of control regimes.  This work continues with Moon and Stotsky (1993) using longitudinal data to estimate 
the impact of rent control on housing quality.  Related work on how controls influence maintenance effort 
and long-term impacts of controls include Olsen (1988), Ault and Saba (1990), and Pollakowski (1999).  
Olsen and Early (1998, 2003) examine the relationship of rent controls with homelessness.  More recently, 
Glaeser and Luttmer (2003) provide a new look at resource misallocation under controls.  While most of   11
condo units have been selling for around $460 per square foot over the past two decades.  
Prices are generally high, and the small difference between the median value of $455 per 
square foot and the mean value of $468 per square foot indicates relatively little skewness 
in the distribution (see the top row of Table 1).  While there is a considerable upper tail 
reflecting apartments that cost much more than $500 per square foot, the high mean value 
is not being driven by a few outliers.   
 
The variation in prices reflects both differences in the physical infrastructure of the 
apartments and the difference in neighborhood amenities.  As our goal is to compare 
condominium prices with construction costs, we obviously are concerned about our 
inability to measure all aspects of physical apartment quality.  However, unless 
neighborhood attributes specifically impact construction costs, the variation in prices that 
is related to neighborhood amenities will not bias our results.  Indeed, in a truly free 
market, these amenities would not create a gap between construction costs and prices.  
More attractive neighborhoods would simply end up having taller buildings.   
 
In the second and third rows of Table 1, we report data from the New York City Housing 
and Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS) for comparison purposes.  Our NYCHVS sample 
combines all independent observations in Manhattan from the years 1991-1999.  This 
widely-used data set has two failings relative to our condominium sales data.  First, it is 
much smaller.  We have only 156 observations of condominiums in Manhattan and 165 
for the outer boroughs.  Second, the price data relies on self-reported market values, not 
actual sales data.  Even given these issues, the Manhattan data from the NYCHVS look 
remarkably similar to the condominium sales data.  The mean price per square foot is 
$500, which is only slightly higher than what actual transactions show (and which 
corresponds well with our priors and the literature on the upward bias of self-reported 
values).  The median price per square foot is $461, which is extremely close to the $455 
value that we observe in the condominium sales data.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
this research deals with the trade-off between equity and efficiency, Arnott (1995) has argued that rent 
control can be efficient in the presence of landlords with some type of monopoly power.   12
However, the data on condominiums in the outer boroughs suggest that the housing 
market outside of Manhattan is extremely different (row 3, Table 1).  The mean price per 
square foot in the outer boroughs is $149/ft
2, with the median value even lower at $120.  
These results do not call into question the Manhattan data, but they do remind us that 
New York’s hot housing market is a very localized phenomenon.  The outer boroughs are 
still full of much less expensive housing.   
 
In the remaining panels of Table 1, we examine prices by apartment size, building height, 
number of units in the building, and over time.  Interestingly, there is little relationship 
between apartment size and value per square foot except among the largest apartments, 
which are more expensive.  All else equal, larger apartments should be somewhat cheaper 
to build on a square foot basis because they have a fixed amount of some forms of 
infrastructure.  Of course, all else is not equal and we believe these differences reflect 
omitted quality factors.  The largest apartments almost certainly are nicer along other 
dimensions, so that it is likely that higher prices also reflect higher quality.   
 
Not surprisingly, there is a tendency of prices to rise in value with building height.  The 
average price per square foot for condos in buildings with between 10 and 20 stories is 
$400, while the average price per square foot in buildings with more than 40 stories is 
$573.  These price differences presumably reflect two factors.  First, apartments in taller 
buildings have better views.  Second, taller buildings will tend to be more modern and 
perhaps be of higher quality.   
 
We also see a pattern whereby prices are higher in larger buildings.  The price per square 
foot is around $400 in the smaller buildings (i.e., those with <20 units), but rises to over 
$500 for units in large buildings (i.e., those with >200 units).  Again, it is unclear if this 
price differential reflects better views or other characteristics that might be related to 
building size.   
 
Finally, examining the data over time finds large increases in the price per square foot 
during the last few years.  Prices were high in the 1980s and fell a bit during the recession   13
in the 1990s.  They then recovered, rising steadily in the second half of the 1990s and 
ending up at a level more than $100/ft
2 above the previous high in the 1980s. 
 
In Table 2, we look at the distribution of condominium prices by geographic location 
within Manhattan.  Eighty-three percent of our sales occur in four neighborhoods that are 
closest to the midtown business district: the Upper East Side, the Upper West Side, Turtle 
Bay/Stuyvesant and Midtown.  Approximately 10 percent of our sales also occur in the 
Greenwich Village/Financial District neighborhood.  Less than five percent of the sales 
occur in the Lower East Side, Harlem, Morningside Heights and Washington Heights.   
 
The most expensive area in the data set is the Midtown area where prices per square foot 
averaged $515, with the median unit selling for $490/ft
2.  The Upper East Side was the 
next most expensive area with a mean price of $509/ft
2.  The Upper West Side was only 
slightly less costly with a mean value per square foot of $494.  Stuyvesant/Turtle Bay had 
the biggest representation in our sample, with over 6,000 units.  The mean price in that 
neighborhood was $436 per square foot.  Units in the financial district and Greenwich 
Village were somewhat cheaper with an average cost per square foot of $416.  The Lower 
East Side apartments were cheaper still, valued at an average of $373 dollars per square 
foot, which is still expensive but almost one-third cheaper than the top price 
neighborhoods.   
 
The remaining three neighborhoods, Morningside Heights, Washington Heights and 
Harlem, appear to be quite different.  In these neighborhoods, prices were generally 
below $250/ft
2, and often well below $200/ft
2.  Indeed, values in these neighborhoods 
look more like the outer boroughs than the rest of Manhattan. 
 
This neighborhood level evidence suggests that there is variation in prices across 
Manhattan, with the uptown areas being considerably cheaper.  Nonetheless, there is a 
fair amount of uniformity across large parts of the borough.  Prices are regularly above 
$400 per square foot and, in many neighborhoods, almost one-half of the apartments cost 
more than $500/ft
2.         14
 
Within the owner-occupied sector, we have focused on condominiums rather than 
cooperative units because we are concerned that sales prices of cooperatives may not 
reflect the true cost of ownership due to their more complex ownership structures and 
allegedly high maintenance fees.  Nevertheless, they do represent a significant fraction of 
the borough’s housing stock so they clearly warrant study despite concerns about data 
quality.   
 
Information on the distribution of self-reported market value per square foot using 
Manhattan coops in the NYCHVS is reported in Table 3.   The mean value is $382/ft
2 , 
with the median sale price being $310/ft
2.  Holding unit and building quality constant, we 
would expect the absence of a straightforward, fee simple ownership status to result in 
lower values for cooperatives because property rights are valuable.  Furthermore, the 
average reported monthly fee associated with these coops is $600/month, which is about 
$200 more than the average reported for condominiums in our sample, and at least 
partially reflects the fact that coop buildings have independent debt.
11  Even with our 
concerns that reported values for cooperatives do not fully reflect the cost of owning the 
unit, these results clearly indicate that high prices are pervasive throughout the owner-
occupied sector of the Manhattan real estate sales market, and are not confined solely to 
condominiums. 
 
The Costs of Production 
 
We now turn to our data on the costs of production.  Our primary source for construction 
cost data is the R. S. Means Company, which surveys developers throughout the United 
States.  Given that no data source is perfect, we supplement the information from Means 
with three other sources.  One is Marshall & Swift, a rival construction cost service.  
Second, we use estimates from the New York University (NYU) Center for Real Estate 
and Urban Policy.  The ultimate source of their data is Zaxon, a third construction cost   15
service.  Finally, we use data on condominium costs outside of New York City using the 
American Housing Survey.  It should be emphasized that in this section of the paper, the 
construction cost data pertain to condominium or cooperative-type product in multiple 
unit buildings (i.e., these are different from the single-family cost data discussed in 
Section IV).   
 
The top panel of Table 4 reports construction costs for residential buildings by height that 
are specifically adjusted for the geographic area of Manhattan by the R.S. Means 
Company.  Consistent cost data are available for structures of less than 25 stories. 
Physical construction costs range from $140-$160 per square foot for structures up to 24 
stories tall.  Taller buildings are modestly more expensive to build, although the Means 
data indicate that marginal costs are constant within a wide range of heights above seven 
stories.
12  If we interpret the Means data as applying to buildings shorter than 30 stories, 
these estimates apply to 88 percent of the buildings in our condominium sample.  The 
NYCHVS topcodes building height at 20 stories, with 80 percent of the observations in 
multifamily structures within Manhattan having fewer stories.  Thus, the vast majority of 
Manhattan residences are in a building type that is comparable with the Means cost 
estimates, and it appears that the marginal cost of increasing the height of a typical 




As an initial check on the reliability of these data, we turn to a separate set of estimates 
provided by the Marshall & Swift Company (see the next panel in Table 4).  These costs 
                                                                                                                                                 
11 Thus, the fee differentials are not due entirely to different maintenance levels or requirements.  See 
Schill, Voicu, and Miller (2003) for a recent analysis of the factors behind the pricing differences between 
condominium and cooperative units in Manhattan. 
12 It is not clear from these data whether costs per square foot are higher or lower for taller buildings.  The 
Means Company notes that larger buildings tend to have lower costs per square foot, primarily due to 
economies of scale and the decreasing contribution of the exterior walls. However, it is possible that 
buildings much taller than 24 stories could have higher costs since they may require stronger structural 
reinforcements and higher quality materials.   
13 One can obtain a slightly higher marginal cost by making different assumptions regarding the underlying 




th floors (i.e., to the midpoints of the three height categories), and then presumed that 
the average cost function is quadratic and goes through those midpoints (i.e., $142,2;  $144,5;  $160,15), 
the total and marginal cost functions can be derived.  In this particular example, marginal costs rise from 
around $140/ft
2 on the lower floors to about $180/ft
2 for floors 10-15.  To be conservative in our 
calculations below, we will use a value of $200/ft
2 for construction costs in the analysis below.   16
also are specific to Manhattan, but this firm provides a bit more detail with respect to the 
different qualities of residential buildings.  Overall, these estimates span the results from 
the R.S. Means Company.  Costs for an average or good quality apartment building are 
about $50 per square foot less than the costs reported by Means; costs for what is termed 
an average quality, luxury apartment are about the same as Means reports;  and costs for 
a high quality, luxury apartment are about $50 per square foot higher than Means 
calculates.  Using this data, the maximum construction cost per square foot is about $220 
per square foot for a very high-end residential building in Manhattan.   
 
Yet another source of construction costs comes from a report prepared by Salama, Schill 
and Stark for the NYU Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy in 1999.  They report 
evidence from Zaxon Inc., another construction cost estimator.  These estimates, adjusted 
to 2002 dollars, indicate a construction cost of about $193 dollars per square foot for a 
15-story apartment building, and $134 per square foot for a six-story building.  These 
data are very much in line with the Means numbers, although the marginal cost for an 
extra floor appears to be somewhat higher in these data.  In addition, the NYU numbers 
are slightly below the cost of a high quality unit according to Marshall & Swift.
14 
 
Our final piece of evidence on construction costs relies on condominium prices from the 
American Housing Survey for areas outside of New York City.  As long as the property 
market has not been trending downward (which is the case for most of the 1990s), sales 
prices should represent an upper bound on construction costs because developers also 
need to turn a profit.
15  The AHS data for Chicago indicate that the average price per 
square foot of condominiums is $144/ft
2.  In buildings with more than 10 stories, the 
price per square foot is $148.  In the rest of the United States, the price per square foot of 
                                                 
14 As a point of reference, physical construction costs above $150/ft
2 are at least as high as those pertaining 
to the highest quality single-family residences.  In its single family construction cost files, the Means 
Company estimates that a large 2,200 square foot, custom quality home with an unfinished basement would 
have cost about $132/ft
2 to build in the New York metropolitan area.  The analogous figure for a luxury 
quality home, which is the highest quality category in the Means data, is $159/ft
2.  [No land costs are 
included in these figures.]  
15 There are too few observations on units in newly constructed buildings to create statistically meaningful 
samples.   17
condominiums equals $129.  This estimate rises to $176/ft
2 if we look only at buildings 
with more than 10 stories. 
 
Although part of the price differential across locations may be attributable to differences 
in construction costs, the R.S. Means data suggest that the difference in construction costs 
across metropolitan areas is relatively small.  For example, Means estimates that 
construction costs are 19 percent higher in the New York area than in Chicago.  As such, 
1.19 times sales prices in Chicago represents yet another estimate of construction costs in 
New York.  Of course, to the extent that there might be a “regulatory tax” in other areas 
as well, this method will overstate construction costs.  Taken together, these data strongly 
suggest that something near $200/ft
2 is a reliable upper bound on the marginal cost of 
‘building up’ for the vast majority of Manhattan apartments.
16 
 
The Regulatory Tax in Manhattan 
 
In computing the regulatory tax as the difference between marginal production costs and 
market price, we will use $200 per square foot as our estimate of the former.  We 
recognize that there will be a small number of apartments that actually cost more than 
this amount to build, but in most cases this value will overstate, not understate, the true 
cost.  When combined with the fact that reported asset values of older units are not 
adjusted for depreciation, these assumptions make it highly likely that our estimate of the 
regulatory tax will be a lower bound.
17     
                                                 
16 As another source, we also turned to data from the New York City permit office.  This office reports an 
estimate of the total value of structures put in place by builders along with the total number of units.  
Dividing the value per unit by the average square footage per unit from our condominium data yielded an 
average cost of $89/ft
2.  While this price is not totally implausible, especially if many of the units were 
somehow controlled or stabilized, it seems quite low.  One explanation for this low value is that builders 
must pay taxes based on the value of construction they report.  Therefore, they have an incentive to 
underestimate true construction costs.  In any event, we take the permit data as further confirmation of our 
view that $200 per square foot is a reasonably generous estimate of the marginal cost of building higher for 
high quality apartment buildings in Manhattan. 
17 Stated differently, none of the prices reported in Tables 1-3 reflect values ‘as if new’.  Ideally, these 
prices should be adjusted (upward) to account for the depreciation that occurs on older units before any 
comparison with replacement costs.  Unfortunately, the condo sales data from the First American Real 
Estate Corporation do not include any information on the age of the buildings in which the units are 
situated.  The NYCHVS does report age in discrete form, including the following five categories:  (a) built 
in the 1990s;  (b) built in the 1980s;  (c) built between 1960-1979;  (d) built between 1930-1959;  and (e)   18
 
Figure 2 begins the comparison by plotting the distribution of price-to-marginal cost 
ratios for condominiums in Manhattan.  Note that very few units have ratios below one.  
In fact, price is above marginal production costs for 93 percent of the sample, with nearly 
two-thirds (63 percent) being worth more than twice marginal costs.  For an 
overwhelming majority of Manhattan condominium owners, this suggests that some 
form(s) of regulatory constraint has meant that their cost of housing is more than double 
what it would be under a free development policy.  Figure 3 charts the same information 
for our smaller sample of cooperative units.  Nearly three-quarters of these units have 
price-to-marginal cost ratios above one, and one-third of this group is valued at more than 
double marginal construction costs.  Thus, it is clear that the regulatory tax is 
meaningfully positive for this segment of the housing stock in Manhattan as well.
18 
 
For the median Manhattan condominium in our sample, the regulatory tax amounts to 
well over half of the total price of the unit.
19  Even for a condo from the 25
th percentile of 
the price distribution, the tax makes up just over 40 percent of the $339/ft
2 total cost.  For 
cooperative units, the measured tax is smaller on average, but still is economically 
significant.  It is $182/ft
2 at the mean, which amounts to 48 percent of average coop value 
                                                                                                                                                 
built prior to 1930.  To try to estimate the impact of depreciation on older structures, we regressed reported 
condo value in the NYCHVS on a set of age dummies to determine the average impact of age on value.  
Adjusting the reported prices to reflect the regression estimates of depreciation yielded a mean of $625/ft
2 
and a median of $601/ft
2 for the 156 Manhattan condominiums in the NYCHVS, which is 20-25 percent 
higher than the reported values.  However, the R
2 from the regression was only 0.04, not all the coefficients 
were statistically significant, and it was not the case that average values were monotonically lower the older 
the structure.  Similar analyses with the cooperative unit observations for Manhattan from the NYCHVS 
yielded slightly higher upward adjustments (in percentage terms).  However, these regression results also 
were somewhat imprecise.  Given these uncertainties, we decided not to work with adjusted (i.e., higher) 
prices.  While ‘as if new’ prices must be higher than the values we use, this decision is a conservative one 
in the sense that it guards against any upward bias in our estimates of the impact of regulatory constraints in 
the housing market.  
18 Our longer working paper version includes plots for the distribution of price-to-construction costs for 
rental units.  While those results are less reliable because we must impute asset values for rental units 
(which is why do not report them here), it is noteworthy that for free-market apartments, 78 percent of the 
units are valued above construction costs.  Despite the fact that rent stabilized apartments are much 
cheaper, it still is the case that 40 percent of them have implied asset values in excess of construction costs.  
This result is particularly striking given that our estimate of construction costs is almost surely an 
overestimate for older, lower quality buildings. 
19 From the top row of Table 1, we know that the median condominium price is $455/ft
2.  Assuming 
$200/ft
2 in construction costs, the implied tax is $255/ft
2.  The ratio of 255/455 equals 56 percent.    19
in Manhattan.  Thus, some type of regulatory constraints in the housing market appears to 
be responsible for at least 50 percent of overall unit value for the mean owned apartment. 
 
Translating these figures into annual cost terms can help illuminate the economic 
relevance of these results.  For simplicity, we presume the annualized cost can be 
approximated by the multiple of the real cost of capital (or the real interest rate) and the 
component of housing prices that we estimate to be the result of regulation.
20  While real 
rates of interest currently appear to be quite high by some calculations
21, we use a more 
conservative estimate of 3 percent for the real cost of capital to current borrowers.  The 
top panel of Table 5 reports the distribution of the annual regulatory costs for owners in 
our condominium sample. For half of the sample, this estimate of the annual flow cost of 
regulation exceeds $5,500 per year, or about 9 percent of mean annual wages in 
Manhattan.  A quarter of the sample is paying at least $9,668 per year, with the mean 
flow value of the tax being $7,382.  At a more detailed level, the value of the tax appears 
to lie between $5,000 and $10,000 per year for 31 percent of our sample.  For another 12 
percent, the burden lies between $10,000 and $15,000 per year.  Yet another 8 percent of 
the sample pays between $15,000 and $25,000 per year.  Finally, 3 percent of the sample 
has a tax amount that is greater than $25,000 per year.
22 
 
III.  Other Evidence on the Regulatory Causes of New York’s High Prices 
 
                                                 
20 A more sophisticated analysis might compute the user cost of owning (e.g., see Poterba (1984) for 
example).  This term includes factors such as local property taxes and maintenance expenses (along with a 
liquidity premium possibly) that also are thought to influence the cost of owning.  For simplicity alone, we 
assume these costs are orthogonal to the regulatory tax and exclude them from our analysis.  To the extent 
they are positively correlated, our annual estimates are lower bounds. 
21 As we write, the current interest rate on 30-year, fixed rate mortgages is approximately 5.6 percent 
(depending upon factors such as points paid and the like) while inflation over calendar year 2002 was only 
1.4 percent according to the annual average personal consumption expenditures chain-price index published 
by the Bureau of the Economic Analysis.  The simple difference between these two figures is 4.2 percent. 
22 These particular results are sensitive to the values of the real cost of capital and true construction costs 
used in the calculation.  However, absent much higher construction costs (e.g., $100 per square foot higher) 
or much lower real interest rates (e.g., Japanese levels of near zero), the annual cost to condominium 
owners is substantial.  In addition, housing prices in part reflect expectations about future prices.  If future 
prices are expected to rise dramatically, then this might explain some of the high prices in New York and 
would suggest that our simple calculation of multiplying the gap between housing prices and construction 
costs with the cost of capital overstates the true impact of regulatory constraints.  Of course, if by chance,   20
Section II has documented that housing prices in Manhattan are far above construction 
costs.   While we have trouble thinking of a plausible alternative explanation other than 
restrictions on construction for this fact, we recognize that we are in some respects just 
naming a residual.  As such, in this section, we offer two alternative pieces of evidence 
which we believe support our contention that the gap between prices and costs is caused 
by barriers to construction.   
 
The Battle of Carnegie Hill 
 
New York City has many examples of battles between developers and local residents, but  
the ‘Battle of Carnegie Hill’, as it was referred to by the local press, is among the most 
famous of these cases.
23  This case from the Upper East Side of Manhattan became 
locally famous because it involved the actors Woody Allen, Kevin Kline, and Paul 
Newman, as well as some of New York City’s financial elite, including Citigroup CEO 
Sanford Weill and the family of the prominent investment banker and former Clinton 
Administration Deputy Secretrary of the Treasury, Roger Altman.   
 
The case itself appeared mundane at first, with Citigroup selling a corner site at 91
st and 
Madison Avenue on which it had built a one-story branch bank facility to a local 
developer.  That firm, Tamarkin Architecture and Development, proposed a 17-story 
apartment building.  Even though the builder had previously acquired the air rights 
necessary for such a tall structure on the site and there are other buildings at least 17 
stories high within eyesight of 91
st and Madison
24, the development was potentially 
                                                                                                                                                 
New York City apartment prices were expected to fall (a not totally implausible possibility) then our 
calculation understates the true effect.    
23 We are grateful to Matt Kahn for bringing this particular case to our attention.  It was reported by the 
New York Times as it was playing out.  For more recent descriptions and overviews of the entire battle 
between the developer and its opponents from various perspectives, the interested reader can see reports 
and commentary from the following three sources:  (a) New York Magazine, available at 
http://www.newyorkmetro.com/nymetro/realestate/neighborhoods/features/4521/;  (b) The City Review, 
available at http://www.thecityreview.com/carmad.htm;  and (c) the article “Carnegie Hill:  By the Content 
of Its Character” which was posted on the ‘upper east side’ section of an electronic guide to what is 
happening in Manhattan;  more specifically, see the Upper East Side, Manhattan section of ‘about.com’ at 
the URL http://uppereastside.about.com/library/weekly/aa031200a.htm.  
24 See photographs in The City Review article cited in footnote 23 for these details.   21
constrained by other facets of the local regulatory environment, most prominently those 
associated with landmarks preservation.
25 
 
In the first half of 2000, the local Landmarks Preservation Commission denied the 
developer’s request to build a 17-story building after hearing from numerous individuals 
and groups that the structure would unjustly change the character of their neighborhood.  
For his part, Mr. Allen even produced a short video about Carnegie Hill, and New York 
Magazine reports that Mr. Kline quoted Richard II to the Landmarks Preservation 
Commission on the matter—“How sour sweet music is, when time is broke, and no 
proportion kept!”.   
 
Even before the Landmarks Preservation Commission stepped in, Mr. Weill faced social 
pressure from at least some of his friends to stop the proposed development.  New York 
Magazine reports that Mr. Altman’s wife, Jurate Kazickas, personally approached Mr. 
Weill and asked him to buy back the site from the local developer--to which Mr. Weill 
allegedly responded by asking why Ms. Kazickas did not buy it back herself.
26  
Presumably, a group including famous entertainers and investment bankers was not 
financially constrained from taking up Mr. Weill’s suggestion and forming their own 
personal ‘preservation trust’, but found it cheaper to achieve much the same end by 
entangling the development in New York City’s regulatory maze.   
 
Approximately three years later, construction finally was begun on a scaled down, 9-story 
building that had been approved by the Landmarks Preservation Commission.  The point 
of this example certainly is not to conduct research by anecdote, however entertaining it 
might be.  That the regulatory process constrains the ability to ‘build up’ beyond this 
example is supported by cases notes in the news reports cited above, as well as by data 
                                                 
25 Any development that is not what is termed ‘as of right’ must go through the Uniform Land Use Review 
Process (or ULURP) in New York City.  The building code and broader regulatory environment that helps 
determine what is and is not ‘as of right’ is very voluminous.  For more on that, see the report by Salaama, 
Schill, and Stark (1999) on the myriad of factors affecting the cost of housing construction in New York 
City.  Their Section 4 on the land use review process, building codes, permit approval, and taxes and fees is 
the most relevant to our work.   
26 For the direct quotes and the entire interchange, see the first page of the article by Ralph Gardner, Jr. on 
the New York Magazine web site listed in footnote 23.   22
we obtained on the distribution of the height of new condominium buildings constructed 
in Manhattan in the 1980s.
27  For example, our sample contains eight structures that were 
erected between 1980 and 1989 in the Midtown section of Manhattan, with their heights 
ranging from 4 to 70 stories.  In the Upper East Side (Carnegie Hill’s neighborhood), 
there were seven condominium buildings put up during the same time period, and they 
ranged in height from 1 to 32 stories.  The Appendix reports analogous data for other 
Manhattan neighborhoods.  While we do not claim that all this heterogeneity is due to 
regulation, the data are abundantly clear that much new residential building has occurred 
at fairly low densities. 
 
The Battle for Carnegie Hill also helps illustrate another very important lesson for our 
research—namely, that it is extremely difficult to accurately measure the degree of 
regulatory constraint facing housing development.  It was not simply the presence of a 
complex local code and one public commission that influenced a developer’s decision to 
bring new housing units to the market, but also the ability of well-funded opponents to 
use the regulatory process to substantially delay and change proposals.  The inability to 
measure all this precisely suggests that traditional difference-in-difference methods may 
radically underestimate the true impact of regulation on housing prices (assuming the 
measurement error is classical in nature, of course).   
 
Permitting and Prices 
 
We now provide another source of data—on house price changes and housing permits—
that is consistent with our hypothesis on the connection between government regulation 
and high prices in Manhattan.  In a free market, one would expect increases in housing 
prices to lead to more new construction, but this need not be the case in a regulated 
market where regulatory constraints of various types can choke off new supply.  Figure 1 
already suggests that there has been a marked drop off in permitting in Manhattan over 
the past two decades, a period over which real house prices rose in excess of 2 percent 
per annum.  In order to look at the relationship between prices and quantities a bit more 
                                                 
27 The data are from the First American Real Estate Corporation, the source of the price data used in   23
closely, we regressed the number of permits issued in Manhattan in a given year on the 
change in prices during the previous year.
28  Figure 4 then plots the data and the 
regression line for four different time periods dating back to 1955.   
 
The 1955-1969 period was a time of relatively modest real price changes, but any 
meaningfully positive appreciation typically was associated with a high level of 
permitting activity the following year.  A similar, but less strongly positive correlation is 
observed for the 1970s in the adjacent plot.  The variability in real price changes was 
greater from 1970-1979, but the association of larger price appreciation with higher 
future permitting activity is still clearly evident.
29  Were this pattern to hold during the 
1980s and 1990s, it clearly would be at odds with our conclusions that this is a market in 
which regulation is constraining builders from bringing new units to market.  However, 
the bottom two graphs in Figure 4 document that changes in prices are not correlated with 
future permitting activity in the 1980s and 1990s.
30   
 
Although these simple regression plots obviously do not concretely identify a supply-
demand framework (something that is well outside the scope of this study), they do 
strongly suggest that the supply side of the housing market was able to respond much 
more flexibly to higher demand in earlier decades.  We know from above that real 
income per capita skyrocketed in Manhattan during the 1980s and 1990s.  Thus, an 
examination of changes in prices and quantities is consistent with rising housing demand 
that was not met by changes in supply.  These conditions could easily have led to the 
present situation in Manhattan in which the market price of the typical unit is at least 
double its production cost.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Section II. 
28 We use lagged prices on the right-hand side on the assumption that it takes some time for developers to 
be able to respond to price changes, even in an unregulated market.  The house price series is for the New 
York metropolitan area.  See the notes to Figure 4 for the details.  There is not an analogous price series for 
Manhattan proper (i.e., for New York County). 
29 Both of the regression-line slopes are significantly different from zero at the 95 percent confidence level.  
However, the estimation error is large enough that we cannot confidently conclude the slope is greater for 
the 1955-69 period.  All regression results are available upon request. 
30 While both slopes are slightly negative, we cannot reject the null that each is zero.   24
IV.  Is There Evidence of a Regulatory Tax in Other Housing Markets? 
 
The housing price data used in this section come from the 21 metropolitan areas tracked 
in the 1998-99 special Metropolitan files of the AHS.  We use observations on single unit 
residences that are owner occupied.
31  Thus, the typical house in these samples is a single 
family, suburban unit. The AHS data include self-reported home values, lot size, and a 
number of other physical attributes of the housing unit including living area square 
footage.  Because the AHS contains no information on building costs, we turn to the R.S. 
Means Company for data on that variable.   
  
The Means data for single family homes contain information on four unit qualities—
economy, average, custom, and luxury.
32  The data are broken down further by the size of 
living area (ranging from 600ft
2 to 3,200ft
2), the number of stories in the unit, and a few 
                                                 
31 Condominiums and cooperatives in buildings with multiple units are excluded from this particular 
analysis. 
32 Means does not produce true constant quality cost series, as the company relies on building code 
requirements to guide its cost estimation process.  Since we will be working with data from two 
consecutive years in this section, economically significant code changes are unlikely.  Nevertheless, these 
data have been criticized by Somerville (1999) for not reflecting actual builder experience or fully 
controlling for quality changes.  While his attempt to develop a constant quality construction cost series via 
hedonic techniques certainly could be quite valuable for analysis over long time spans, we do not believe 
the results of that analysis warrant not using the Means data or making adjustments to it.  Somerville’s 
results are based on data from a single home builder operating in three markets (Baltimore, Cincinnati, and 
Houston) over a thirteen year period from 1979-1991, so it is not surprising that a single firm’s experience 
does not match a market-wide average.  Moreover, the sample size in Somerville (1999) works out to an 
average of just under 60 observations per market area per year.  Given the very small number of 
subdivisions that must be involved, this only increases the chances of idiosyncratic factors driving the 
differences between his hedonic series and the Means data for his three markets.  In addition, there is no 
indication that a standard confidence interval around his hedonic cost estimate would not encompass the 
Means series.  [There is no direct evidence that it would, either.  We cannot replicate his results without 
access to the confidential data supplied by his builder and the first-stage results.  References to large 
standard errors on key year controls in his first-stage regression hint that the confidence interval could be 
relatively wide.]  
  Other factors also increase our confidence in the Means data.  One is that it has passed a market 
test in the sense the firm has successfully sold its construction cost estimates for over 60 years.  While we 
recognize the conceptual superiority of a true constant quality cost series, none has been developed yet that 
has passed such a test.  Another is that the Means data have performed well in other contexts.  Glaeser and 
Gyourko (2003) and Gyourko and Saiz (2003) have used the Means cost data in the construction of 
variables that work well (i.e., as the relevant theory would predicts) in regression analysis.  While there is 
no doubt that Means measures construction costs with some error, we know of no reason to suspect a 
systematic bias.  And, if the data largely reflected noise, then it is unlikely it would perform so well in the 
papers just cited.  Finally, the cost estimates that Means produces for the Manhattan market are close to 
those we were able to gather from other independent sources for that market.  We do not have independent 
sources for any of the other markets we study.         25
other differentiators.  In our comparisons with house prices from the metropolitan files of 
the AHS, we presume that construction costs are those associated with the mean of 
economy and average quality homes.  Holding constant the size and other physical traits 
of the unit, construction costs for an average quality home are about 40 percent higher 
than those for an economy quality home according to the Means data.  Thus, our 
estimates of construction cost reflect modest quality, but not the lowest possible quality 
that meets building code requirements.
33      
 
While there are various adjustments that need to be made to the data before comparing 
house prices to construction costs, the biggest difficulty with this procedure is in inferring 
the free market cost of land.
34  As discussed above, we use the AHS data to estimate the 
marginal value of land via a standard housing hedonic that expresses the value of a house 
as a function of its various characteristics, including the amount of land on which it sits.  
The estimated coefficient on land area will reflect the degree to which the market 
valuation of a house increases with lot size.  Of course, this estimate of the market 
valuation of land area may be biased, particularly if the amount of land is correlated with 
omitted housing characteristics.  If houses on bigger lots tend to be of higher quality (in 
ways that we cannot explicitly control for), the resulting specification error will bias the 
                                                 
33 This assumption of modest, but not really low, quality is also reflected in our assumptions that the costs 
are for a one-story house with an unfinished basement and the average costs associated with four possible 
types of siding and building frame.  In addition, we develop cost estimates for small (<1,500ft
2), medium 
(1,550-1,850ft
2), and large (>1,850ft
2) homes in terms of living area. 
34 Two adjustments are made to the AHS data before comparing house prices to construction costs.  These 
are to account for the depreciation that occurs on older homes and to account for the fact that research 
shows owners tend to overestimate the value of their homes.  To account for the latter factor, we follow 
Goodman and Ittner (1992) and presume that owners typically overvalue their homes by 6 percent.  
Empirically, the more important adjustment takes into account the fact that the vast majority of homes are 
not new and have experienced real depreciation.  Depreciation factors are estimated using the AHS as 
follows.  First, house value per square foot (scaled down by the Goodman & Ittner correction) in the 
relevant year is regressed on a series of age controls and metropolitan area dummies.  The age data are in 
interval form so that we can tell if a house is from 0-5 years old, from 6-10 years old, from 11-25 years old, 
from 25-36 years old, and more than 45 years old.  As expected, the coefficients on the age controls are 
each negative and represent the extent to which houses of different ages have depreciated in value on a per 
square foot basis.  We then adjust the reported values to account for the estimated depreciation so as to 
compare the value of a unit as if it were new with its replacement cost.  On average, this adjustment results 
in about a 40 percent higher asset value for comparison with new construction costs.  See our 2002 working 
paper for more detail on this procedure.   26
coefficient upwards.  Conversely, omitted characteristics will bias the coefficient 
downwards if houses on bigger lots are built where land is cheap.
35  
 
Hedonic estimates of the value of land per square foot (in 2000 dollars) for the 21 
metropolitan areas surveyed in the two most recent waves of the metropolitan files of the 
AHS are reported in Table 6 (see column 3).
36  The metropolitan area files provide a 
relatively large number of observations, thereby allowing us to estimate attribute prices 




The results from column three of Table 6 indicate a wide range of prices across 
metropolitan areas, ranging from 13-15 cents per square foot in Birmingham and Houston 
to about $4 per square foot in the Bay Area communities of San Francisco and San Jose.  
                                                 
35 While these are the most likely sources of bias, there probably are other factors making it difficult to pin 
down the value of a standard unit of land (e.g., differential option value across locations, etc.).  Our strategy 
is to make every effort possible to guard against our Regulatory Tax estimates from being biased upward 
for the single family house markets in which we must estimate land value as part of the marginal cost of 
production.  Toward that end, we restrict the underlying samples from the AHS to homes with no more than 
two acres of land (i.e., with less than 87,120 square feet of lot).  Including observations with larger amounts 
of land reduces estimated land prices below those reported below in Table 6, suggesting that there is some 
downward bias of the hedonic estimates associated with large lot residences being developed in parts of the 
metropolitan area with cheap land.  In addition, as suggested above, the hedonic estimate of land price will 
overestimate the free market value in markets with binding regulatory constraints. 
36 Four different hedonic specifications were estimated.  Generally, the specifications are of the following 
form:  House Price =  p*Land Area + z*Other Controls, where the model is estimated separately for each 
metropolitan area.  The other controls include the number of bedrooms, the number of bathrooms, the 
number of other rooms, an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if the home has a fireplace, an 
indicator variable that takes on a value of one if the home has a garage, an indicator variable that takes on a 
value of one if the home is in the central city of the metropolitan area, an indicator variable that takes on a 
value of one if the home has a basement, an indicator variable that takes on a value of one if the home has 
central air-conditioning, and the age of the home.  Two of the specifications use the logged value of house 
price, while two are purely linear in nature.  In addition, two of the models (one logged, the other not) use 
the data on interior square footage to capture the size of the home, while the other two use the detail on the 
number of bedrooms, bathrooms, and other rooms.  In general, the results were quite consistent, although 
there is some variability in estimated land prices across the different hedonic models.  The land prices in 
Table 6 are the mean of the values from the two specifications yielding the second and third highest prices 
(i.e., we rank the specifications from lowest to highest implicit land prices estimated and report the average 
of the prices from the second and third specifications).  The key conclusions regarding the zoning tax are 
not sensitive to this choice.   All the underlying results are available upon request. 
37 Our 2002 paper performed a similar analysis using the 1999 national file of the American Housing 
Survey.  The results are similar quantitatively, with the coastal metropolitan areas having much higher 
marginal prices of land.  However, the estimates here tend to be smaller and much more precisely 
estimated.  Given the far fewer number of observations at the metropolitan area level in the national file, 
we are much more confident of the reliability of the results reported here.   27
While there clearly are some high price places, these data suggest that consumers in most 
areas place a relatively low value on land on the margin.  In 16 of the 21 metropolitan 
areas, the estimated price is below $1 per square foot.  In the two lowest price areas of 
Birmingham and Houston, the hedonic land values imply that a typical homeowner 
would be willing to pay no more than $1,400-$1,600 for an extra quarter acre of land.
38  
Even in the Baltimore and Salt Lake City metropolitan areas, in which we estimate the 
price of land to be from $0.83-$0.88 per square foot, a quarter acre of land is valued at no 
more than $9,040.  On the other hand, the hedonic price of land is much higher on the 
West Coast.  Using the $4 per square foot average of the prices in the two Bay Area 
metropolitan areas surveyed implies that a quarter acre is valued at well over $40,000.   
 
While these calculations obviously take some liberty with the meaning of a small change 
in the quantity of land, they do illustrate that the value of land as measured by these 
hedonic prices is not likely to constitute the bulk of the total value of the typical home in 
most of these metropolitan areas.  This is evident by comparing the quarter acre land 
values discussed above with the mean home prices (in 2000 dollars) reported in column 
four of Table 6.           
 
The final column in Table 6 reports our estimate of the Regulatory Tax as a percentage of 
average house value in the metropolitan area.  Note that the tax is zero or negligible 
(defined as less than 10 percent) in over half the markets.
39  However, the tax exceeds 10 
percent of average home price in nine market areas (Boston, Los Angeles, New York, 
Newport News, Oakland, Salt Lake City, San Francisco, San Jose, and Washington, DC).  
While the 12 percent figure for the New York metropolitan area is interesting for 
comparison purposes with the results we reported above for Manhattan condominiums, 
the impact of regulation on land values is much higher in other markets, especially those 
                                                 
38 There are 43,560 square feet in an acre of land, so $0.13*10,890=$1,416 and $0.15*10,890=$1,634. 
39We assigned a value of zero for the Regulatory Tax if physical construction costs exceeded the average 
house price in the metropolitan area.  We would not expect to see new construction in areas with 
production costs above market prices.  In all areas but Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, a positive Regulatory 
Tax results if we assume construction costs associated with the lowest quality units (i.e., economy homes) 
tracked in the Means Company data.  Effective house quality may, in fact, be lower than we presume in 
these areas, but we think it preferable to employ assumptions that lead our estimates to be conservative 
rather than aggressive.   28
on the west coast.  In Los Angeles, Oakland, San Francisco, and San Jose, the gap 
between prices on the extensive and intensive margins amounts to from one-third to one-
half of home value at the mean.  In Boston, Newport News, and Washington, DC, the gap 
constitutes about one-fifth of total property value.  
 
Thus, the evidence for single-family housing markets across a diverse set of metropolitan 
areas recently tracked by the American Housing Survey suggests a big role for regulatory 
restrictions in accounting for high house prices in a select set of primarily coastal 
markets.  While we have taken every possible precaution to guard against our Regulatory 
Tax estimates from being biased upward, we fully recognize that the inability to fully 
control for heterogeneity in the quality of land makes these estimates less robust than 
those reported above for Manhattan.     
 
Faith in the reliability of these regulatory tax estimates would be increased by showing 
that they are related to zoning or other land use restrictions.  Unfortunately, such data are 
difficult to obtain.  Perhaps the most prominent source of such information comes from 
the Wharton Land Use Control Survey.  This survey took place in 1989 and covered 60 
metropolitan areas.  While this is a decade prior to our AHS-based results, if there is 
persistence in the strictness of land use controls over time
40, then we still should see a 
meaningfully positive correlation between our Regulatory Tax measure and the severity 
of land use restrictions.   
 
Among other variables in the Wharton Land Use Control Survey is a measure of the 
average length of time between an application for subdivision approval and the issuance 
building permits for a modest size, single family subdivision of less than 50 units, which 
we term SUBDIVTIME.  This measure can take on values ranging from one to five with 
a value of one indicating the permit issuance lag is less than three months, a value of two 
indicating the time frame is between three and six months, a value of three indicating a 7-
                                                 
40 Housing industry professionals certainly claim there is, but there is no consistent time series evidence of 
which we are aware on this matter.  This clearly is a matter that future research should address.   29
12 month lag, a value of four meaning the lag is between one and two years, and a five 
signaling a very long lag of over two years. 
 
We are able to match data for this variable with 20 of the 21 metropolitan areas reported 
in Table 6.
41  The simple correlation between our regulatory tax measure and 
SUBDIVTIME is 0.74.  Regressing our regulatory tax estimate on SUBDIVTIME finds 
that a unit increase in the categorical zoning lag variable is associated with a 15 
percentage point increase in the amount of the regulatory tax.
42  While this sample size is 
quite small and no causality can be inferred, it still is comforting that the places we 
estimate to have high regulatory tax levels are in fact those with more onerous zoning.
43 
 
V.  Can Manhattan’s Regulatory Tax Be Justified?  
 
While our findings suggest that regulation has restricted supply in Manhattan and a few 
other coastal housing markets, the existence of such a gap between price and marginal 
cost is not necessarily inefficient.  Indeed, much of the literature on zoning (see Fischel, 
1985) has argued that land use controls are absolutely necessary to get developers to 
internalize the social costs of their actions.   In this section, we ask whether there is likely 
to be any negative externality large enough to warrant a Regulatory Tax of the size we 
estimate exists for Manhattan.   
 
                                                 
41 The Wharton Land Use Control Survey did not include the Norfolk-Newport News area. 
42 The R
2=0.55 and the t-statistic on the zoning constraint variable is 3.2 from this regression with 20 
observations. 
43 Other measures in the data base include the analogue to this zoning delay question, except that the permit 
length time applies to a request for rezoning for residential building purposes in a small subdivision.  
Examination of this and other related variables found correlation patterns similar to those just reported.  In 
our longer working paper version we also investigated the correlation between our regulatory tax variable 
and the time to permit issuance following zoning requests using data from the 1989 national file of the 
AHS.  Two benefits of using that data are that the year is identical to that of the zoning survey and a few 
more metropolitan areas can be matched across the two data sources.  The biggest drawback is that there 
are far fewer observations per metropolitan area, so that the underlying hedonic trait price estimation used 
to compute the price of land and, therefore, the regulatory tax amount, is much noisier.  The correlation 
between the regulatory tax estimates and the zoning measure was smaller, but still significantly positive at 
0.39.  And, the analogous regression still yields a significantly positive coefficient implying about a 7 
percentage point increase in the regulatory tax amount for a unit increase in the categorical zoning 
regressor.  See Table 6 to our 2002 working paper for those details.    
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In Manhattan, an optimal zoning tax should incorporate at least three elements in order to 
reflect the marginal social cost of a new resident to the community.  First, and most 
obviously, the zoning tax should reflect the fact that a new apartment may eliminate 
views of existing apartments.  Indeed, most current height restrictions exist for exactly 
that reason.  Second, the new development should be taxed to the extent there are 
negative externalities created by extra crowding.  Pure wage effects (i.e., the fact that 
more workers can depress wages) are pecuniary, not real, externalities and the usual 
economic logic suggests that these effects should not be part of the development tax.  
Third, any tax should reflect the fiscal burden of the new resident.  The fiscal burden 
should be defined as the difference between government expenditures on the new resident 
and the taxes that the resident will face.  After addressing each component in turn, we 
conclude that the present degree of regulatory constraint on new housing construction is 
inefficiently higher—and most probably by a wide margin.    
  
While welfare analyses of zoning are inherently difficult to perform, Manhattan provides 
perhaps the best possible laboratory.  Adding even a large number of housing units and 
people will not change the basic nature of the place, a factor that makes the evaluation 
much more straightforward.  That said, our results are most properly viewed as educated 
guesses, not precise estimates.   
 
Estimating the Value of Views Destroyed by New Construction 
 
The view-related externality is perhaps the most straightforward to estimate.  For each 
new apartment, the view-related externality equals the number of views blocked by a new 
apartment times the welfare cost of blocking a view.  The number of views blocked 
should reflect the marginal impact of a single new apartment given the existing structure 
of apartments in New York.   
 
In a world with homogeneous consumers, the welfare value of a view should equal the 
current market price of a view, which can be estimated by comparing apartments with or   31
without views.
44  Benson, et. al. (1998) have recently reviewed the existing literature on 
hedonic estimates of the price of a view.  Estimates vary, but a typical result suggests that 
a good view raises the value of the property by about 10 percent.  However, most of this 
literature uses cross sectional data on single family homes and often estimates the value 
of a view associated with some type of natural resource such as the ocean or a mountain 
range.  Hence, the relevance for our problem of the value of an urban view is somewhat 
limited. 
 
Consequently, we decided to compare the prices of condominiums in the upper and lower 
floors of the same building using our sample of Manhattan condos, which covers 20,426 
units in 518 apartment buildings.  We regressed price (in log form) on the square footage 
of the unit (also in log form) and a series of dummy variables controlling for the floor of 
the unit and a measure of unit size.  Specifically, we included a dummy variable ( 20 - 11 I)  
that takes on a value of one if the unit is on floors 11-20, another dummy variable ( 30 - 21 I)  
that equals one if the unit is on the 21
st-30
th floors, and yet another ( + 31 I ) for units on or 
above the 31
st floor of their buildings.  The regression results were as follows 
 
(2) 
(.008)           (.01)               (.009)           (.006)                      
Footage)   Log(Square 00 . 1 I .23 I .16 I 08 . Log(Price) 30 30 - 21 20 - 11 • + • + • + • = + . 
 
The regression also includes building-specific fixed effects and year-of-sale fixed effects 
that are not reported here.  Standard errors are in parentheses and the R
2=0.59.  
 
We are most interested in the coefficient on the  + 31 I  indicator variable that effectively 
captures the difference in the prices of condos on the bottom ten floors of the building 
relative to those above the 30
th floor.  Fully recognizing that this coefficient of 0.23 is 
                                                 
44In principle, this will be true with heterogeneous consumers as well as long as there are enough 
apartments of differing types.  If a new apartment blocks the view of someone who values his view more 
than the market does, this person can just move apartments and acquire a new (identical) apartment with a 
view paying the market cost of a view.  Of course, we recognize that urban housing markets are rarely that 
fluid.     32
likely to overstate the value of a view
45, the results suggest that the difference in value 
between being really high up in a building and being on the first ten floors is about 25 
percent of unit price, which we use as our estimate of the value of a view.
46   
 
How many apartments’ views does a new apartment block?  No economic literature on 
this topic exists.  One should be an upper bound on this number.  After all, the worst 
outcome possible is that no apartments have any views, and this would mean that on 
average each apartment blocks one other apartment’s view.  Of course, it is easy to 
contemplate lower numbers.  For example, it is possible to imagine tall buildings spaced 
far enough from one another (perhaps in the Corbusier Radiant City) so that no views are 
blocked.  We take 0.5 as a reasonable middle ground and we will use this value as our 
estimate.   
 
Given the assumptions, each new apartment destroys one-half of a view of some other 
apartment.  Since the loss of one complete view would reduce the value of the apartment 
by 25 percent, each extra dollar of tall building will lead to about 12.5 cents of lost view.  
This finding suggests that lost views are not likely to amount for more than 10-15 percent 
of the total value of new housing.  As such, views alone suggest that apartments should 
face a construction related regulatory tax equal to approximately 12.5 percent of their 




A second possible source of externalities that could justify a large regulatory tax on 
development is crowding.  If people find living in a crowded place distasteful or more 
costly, then it is sensible to tax new residents for the costs they impose on current 
                                                 
45 Unit quality is not fully captured by controlling for unit size (and we do not have other variables in our 
data set).  If interior quality is superior on higher floors, as we suspect is the case, our estimate of view is 
biased upward.  We are largely unconcerned by this because our goal is not to provide a precise measure, 
but to determine whether views and other externalities could reasonably justify the gap between values and 
costs that we currently see in Manhattan.  An overly generous estimate of the value of a view serves that 
purpose well.   33
residents.   This is a difficult issue to analyze for a number of reasons.  First, there is 
research in urban and transportation economics which suggests that tall buildings actually 
help internalize congestion because trips can be shortened or the number reduced.
47  If 
that effect is dominant, then building up should be subsidized, not taxed. A related 
question is whether the appropriate tax should be based on gross or net congestion.  Gross 
congestion can be thought of as the social costs imposed on New Yorkers created by one 
more apartment in New York.  Net congestion is the social costs imposed on New 
Yorkers by having one more apartment minus the social costs alleviated by having the 
apartment located somewhere else.  Perhaps in an ideal system, all localities would 
charge fully for the gross congestion cost to that locality.  However, if some localities are 
not charging (as Table 6 suggests is the case), then it seems like the appropriate tax 
should be based on net congestion costs. 
 
Indeed, the net congestion cost imposed by an extra apartment in New York might be 
positive.  Given New York’s specialization in high density, we suspect that congestion 
externalities could be lower in Manhattan than anywhere else in the country.  First, the 
island does not have a bucolic, rural character that would be spoiled by new residents.  
Second, residents of Manhattan overwhelmingly take public transportation or walk.  Only 
11 percent of Manhattan residents in the 2000 census reported driving alone or 
carpooling to work.  Congestion does matter on the sidewalks or the subways, but it is far 
less important than when driving, mostly because people without cars take up so much 
less room than people with automobiles.  Congestion also could be reduced if the number 
of overall trips is reduced by building to greater densities, per the discussion just above.  
If one accepts these arguments, then it seems quite likely that the relative congestion 
effect of moving to New York (versus whatever alternative locale) is likely to be 
negative.  By turning a car driver into a subway rider, congestion on net is reduced rather 
than increased.  Moreover, urban residents of Manhattan move there in part to be around 
other people.  This reflects a congestion amenity, not a disamenity.   
                                                                                                                                                 
46 Because the indicator variable is not continuous, the derivative relating price to floor is not well defined.  
Using the adjustment suggested by Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) for such cases yields the 25 percent 
figure. 
47 See Fujita (1989) and Kanemoto (1980) for reviews and the theory behind this contention.   34
 
While we suspect the net congestion externality may be positive, we do not try to 
estimate it, especially since it would be determined by the relevant alternative locale.  
Instead, we will attempt to estimate the size of gross congestion externalities, which 
should be thought of as the cash value of the total loss of utility on everyone in 
Manhattan created by a new resident.  The natural means of estimating this value is to see 
whether rents, holding income constant, rise or fall with city population.  If people 
demand a compensating wage differential for living in a more densely populated city, 
then a natural measure of urban amenities is the real income in the metropolitan area.  In 
this case, income will be low in cities where amenities are high and high where amenities 
are low.  As such, if the distaste for crowding is large, then we should expect to see a 
strong relationship between real income and city size.    
 




(3) Log(Median Rent)=-3.4+   1.04*Log(Per Capita Income)-.05*Log(City Population) 
                  (.64)   (.06)                                         (.016) 
 
Standard errors are in parentheses, and the R
2=0.58.
49  The –0.05 coefficient on log 
population indicates that rents fall only modestly with increases in population, income 
held constant.  The fact that a one percent increase in population causes a .05 percent 
decrease in rents suggests that people are paying less (holding income constant) in more 
populated places.  This supports the idea that there is a small gross congestion 
externality.
50 
                                                 
48 This sort of specification will generate the elasticity that we are interested in if, for example, 
A P W U + = /  across cities, where U  is reservation utility, W is wages, P is the price level (which will 
be proxied for with rents) and A equals the amenity level. 
49 The regression also included a control for the percent of residents over the age of 25 with less than 9 
years of schooling. 
50 That said, other specifications indicated a smaller negative or even positive effect of population.  For 
example, controlling for land area turns the population coefficient positive, although not statistically 
significantly so.  [The coefficient on land area is significantly negative, as expected.]  We also tried 
controlling for density directly and found denser areas had higher prices.  At face value, this suggests that 
crowding is good.  However, this probably reflects omitted variables having to do with supply constraints   35
 
While there certainly are reasons to question these estimates (e.g. the endogeneity of the 
variables discussed just above in footnote 50), they strike us as reasonable benchmarks 
for the value of the gross congestion externality in New York.  Using this estimate, a one 
percent increase in city population reduces the utility level (measured as a share of 
housing costs) by one-twentieth of one percent.  Another way to interpret this value is 
that with an extra percent of population in New York, the value of all homes will drop by 
one-twentieth of one percent due to congestion externalities.  This argues for an 
additional five percent zoning tax on new apartments due to these congestion 
externalities.  Thus, there appears no way that congestion externalities themselves could 
justify anything close to the size of the Regulatory Tax that we presently see in 
Manhattan. 
 
Wage effects are even more problematic to estimate and interpret.  As already noted, 
there are reasons to think that this impact should be ignored.  If it is driven through 
standard labor market effects, then these are pecuniary rather than real externalities.  And, 
in many cases, new apartments will lead to a redistribution of population from the 
suburbs to the central city and will not change the total size of New York’s labor force.   
 
The very direction of the impact of additional workers on wages in Manhattan is not at all 
clear.  Although standard estimates in the labor economics literature find the slope of the 
demand curve to be steeply downward-sloping
51, those results do not pertain to our 
analysis because they hold output and capital constant.  In our case, it is not reasonable to 
assume that more workers simply would be dumped into Manhattan with no reallocation 
of capital or additional local output.
52  Effectively, adding more people to the area will 
cause the demand for labor to shift out.  Furthermore, urban agglomeration theory 
                                                                                                                                                 
or local amenities.  In addition, attempts to instrument for population and density in the crowding 
regressions yielded slightly positive coefficients on population.  In any event, all the analyses we have done 
indicates that –5 percent is an upper bound on this particular externality. 
51 In a comprehensive survey of the literature, Hamermesh (1993) concludes that the elasticity of 
employment with respect to wages lies in the range of -0.15 to -0.75.  These values imply an elastic 
response of wages with respect to employment. 
52 One would have to make an extreme assumption about the share of tradeable goods across areas to get no 
local output effects.     36
suggests that productivity also may increase, with firms passing on some of the gains to 
workers.  Thus, the diminishing marginal productivity of labor notwithstanding, wages 
might well rise with city population. 
 
In fact, empirical work by Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Glaeser and Mare (2001) finds 
that increasing population levels are associated with increasing – not decreasing – wage 
rates when one looks at the relationship across cities.  If agglomeration economies were 
dominant as these results indicate, then zoning restrictions would impose an additional 
cost in terms of limiting city size.  Our experimentation with a number of models 
sometimes yielded a negative impact on wages, but it never was large (in absolute value) 
or statistically significant.
53  In any event, even if this reflects a real, not a pecuniary, 
externality, its magnitude is far too small to rationalize development constraints that 
leave prices at least double production costs.     
 
Fiscal Externalities from New Construction 
 
The final category of social costs due to new construction that we examine comes 
through government taxation and expenditure.  If new residents require far more in local 
government expenditures than they pay in taxes, then this would be yet another reason for 
potentially taxing new construction.  Of course, one could argue that a sensible response 
to these fiscal externalities is just to charge new residents directly for the services that 
they use, instead of relying on some type of development tax.  Still, it is worthwhile 
asking whether new residents in Manhattan condominiums even create a net fiscal drain 
on New York City. 
 
While compelling statistics do not exist, there are a number of good reasons to believe 
that new residents in Manhattan condominiums would represent a considerable fiscal 
                                                 
53 Empirical work in this area is fraught with various potential specification biases, so accurately pinning 
down an impact is very difficult.  For example, regression estimates of the population-wages relationship 
using cross-sectional variation may be upwardly biased because more productive places (with higher 
incomes) end up attracting more people and, therefore, have larger populations.  Regressions using changes 
in population and income may also be biased if increases in urban population are driven by increases to the 
productivity of the metropolitan area.   37
transfer to, not from, the city.  First, these residents tend to be rich.  People living in 
apartments that cost more than $500,000 will tend to be far richer than the average New 
Yorker.  As such, they are likely to increase the average income in the city.  Second, 
these residents tend to have small numbers of children.  On average, 23 percent of the 
residents of Manhattan are enrolled in school, as opposed to 27 percent for the city as a 
whole.  The residents of expensive condominiums are also disproportionately likely to 
have smaller families and to enroll their children in private schools.  These individuals 
are paying taxes for the use of schools and not using them, to the benefit of the 
government’s budget.  Finally, a number of government expenditures entail large fixed 
costs.  For these expenditures, new population is an unqualified improvement since it 
allows those expenditures to be spread over a larger base.  Altogether, we are quite 
confident that the residents of new condominiums in Manhattan, even if those apartments 
were priced at $200/ft
2 rather than $500/ft
2, are likely to be a fiscal boon, not a fiscal 
drain on the city.   
 
While the analysis in this section does not allow us to pin down the level of the optimal 
tax (or subsidy) on new development, it does show that there is no negative externality 
(or combination of externalities) remotely large enough to justify the current gap between 
prices and production costs of condominiums in Manhattan.  Moreover, it is possible that 
a thorough analysis of the impact on transportation might even justify subsidizing denser 
construction in Manhattan.  And, when one recalls that we have been very conservative in 
not adjusting market values for depreciation, thereby minimizing the measured gap 
between condominium values and their physical construction costs, it is hard to escape 
the conclusion that regulatory constraints on building in Manhattan are far too restrictive.   
 
VI.  Conclusion 
  
Home building is an enormously competitive industry with virtually no natural barriers to 
entry.  Price markups over construction costs, therefore, are a strong indication of 
artificial barriers to new construction.  In the bulk of the United States, the costs of 
producing housing are hard to estimate because of the lack of reliable data on the cost of   38
land.  Nevertheless, the data that are available indicate that in expensive coastal areas 
especially, there often is a substantial gap between the price of housing and construction 
costs.  This gap suggests the power of land use controls in limiting new construction. 
 
There is similar evidence of an important regulatory impact for Manhattan.  Not only is 
this market interesting in its own right, but since the cost of building an apartment is 
always the cost of building up, construction costs for apartments are much easier to 
estimate.  Because building up does not involve using more land, we can use the physical 
costs of construction to determine the costs of building an extra apartment without 
knowing the underlying cost of land.  After examining several sources, we find that $200 
per square foot is about the maximum conceivable value of those construction costs in 
Manhattan.  This level is high, but it is far below most condominium prices in Manhattan, 
which are now routinely two times that amount.  As such, perhaps one half or more of the 
price of most condominiums in Manhattan can be thought of as the result of some type of 
regulatory constraint preventing the construction of new housing.  Other evidence also 
supports the importance of regulation.  For example, over the past 40 years in Manhattan, 
we have seen a substantial contraction in the number of residential building permits. 
 
In principle, regulations limiting building need not be economically inefficient.  
However, we can find no externality associated with new housing units in Manhattan that 
is remotely large enough to warrant a development tax that is equal to construction costs 
themselves.   
 
Why is the construction environment so restrictive and why has it become so much more 
restrictive over time?  Our view is that there has been a re-allocation of property rights 
over the past 30 years.  In the 1960s, land-owners were generally free to develop their 
property in the manner that they desired.  However, starting in that decade and 
increasingly over the 1970s, 80s and 90s, neighbors have become increasingly effective 
in opposing new construction.  As illustrated by the battle for Carnegie Hill, increasingly 
media-savvy local residents have become adept at using every means possible to restrict   39
new construction.  The result of this has been a reassignment of property rights from 
developers to local homeowners. 
 
Of course, the Coase theorem tells us that this reassignment need not be inefficient.   
However, the reassignment of property rights appears to have resulted in rights that are 
both diffuse and poorly defined.  The large amount of real estate litigation suggests that 
ownership is hard to clearly establish.  Moreover, politics is frequently involved in 
property rights may be more closely linked to the ability to generate votes than any pre-
ordained legal right.  These poorly defined, widely diffused property rights help us to 
understand why sensible mechanisms have not come about where developers efficiently 
compensate existing homeowners for any losses due to new construction.   Furthermore, 
existing residents will always try to behave like monopolists, and will try to reduce 
supply to boost their own home values.
54  Hopefully, future work will help us to 
understand why the impediments to new construction in Manhattan and certain other 
market have grown so much, and appear to be so high.   
 
                                                 
54 Of course, this begs the question of why we do not see big gaps between price and marginal cost in all 
markets.  Clearly, something else is influencing the propensity to act like monopolists.  That is a subject for 
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1  23,060  468 339 455 572 
Manhattan2      156  500  271  461  664 
Other Boroughs2      165  149  89  120  177 
By Unit Size
1 
≤600  sq.ft.  5,460  434 311 432 534 
600≤sq.ft. ≤800 6,722  445 339 439 542 
800≤sq.ft. ≤1200  6,729  472 346 460 580 
1200≤sq.ft.    4,149  542 378 519 680 
By Building Height
1 
≤10  Stories  3,686  377 252 365 474 
10<Stories≤20  5,760  400 269 385 500 
20<Stories≤30  3,199  497 396 482 577 
30<Stories≤40  5,227  498 384 489 589 
40<Stories  4,788  573 438 543 678 
By Building Size
1 
<20  Units  1,063  406 256 380 526 
20≤Units<100  5,548  415 285 398 513 
100≤Units<200 5,729  458 338 447 562 
200≤Units  10,720  506 383 488 603 
By Year
1 
1984  700  373 221 359 488 
1985  982  451 305 450 550 
1986  1105 467 371 482 584 
1987  1616 507 420 505 591 
1988  2032 518 419 498 586 
1989  1535 515 391 484 586 
1990  911  443 340 434 516 
1991  722  421 310 383 499 
1992  755  363 273 343 426 
1993  41  385 284 379 463 
1994  87  369 279 341 431 
1995  232  354 267 342 408 
1996  1044 353 272 331 409 
1997  952  384 284 357 433 
1998  2114 410 315 392 476 
1999  2484 460 366 446 533 
2000  1873 557 451 553 652 
2001  1642 601 503 592 696 
2002  972  621 529 606 706 
1.  Source:  Condominium sales records from First American Real Estate Corporation.  Nominal sales 
prices are converted to real 2002 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. 
2.  Source:  New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey.  Price is the reported market value for owner-
occupied condos.  Unit square feet is imputed from the number of rooms using the average square 
feet/room from condos in the New York MSA of the American Housing Survey.   45
 
















Manhattan  23,060 468 339 455 572  27 
By Neighborhood in Manhattan 
Greenwich Village/ 
Financial District 
2,703  416 309 405 501  16 
Lower East Side / 
Chinatown 
   711  373  240  378  474    7  
Chelsea / Clinton / 
Midtown 
4,086  515 355 490 648  34 
Stuyvesant Town/  
Turtle Bay 
6,534  436 330 443 539  31 
Upper West Side 
 
3,913  494 361 476 592  24 
Upper East Side 
 
4,759  509 372 490 611  29 
Morningside Heights / 
Hamilton Heights 
    18  162  130  141  190    5 
Harlem 
 
   131  277  191  245  371    6 
Washington Heights / 
Inwood 
   128  169  91  162  210    6 
Source:  Condo sales records.  All nominal values are converted to real 2002 dollars using the CPI. 
1. Average number of stories.   46














Value per Square Foot  794  382  176  310    501 
Source: New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey.   
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Table 4: Construction Costs 
 Cost/sq.ft. 
RS Means: Apartments in New York City 
8-24 story   160 
4-7 story   144 
1-3 story  142 
Marshall & Swift: Apartments in Manhattan
1 
High-quality luxury apartments  218 
Average-quality luxury apartments  156 
Good-quality apartments, 3+ stories  123 
Average-quality apartments, 3+ stories    96 
NYU Center for Real Estate and Urban Policy
2 
15 story luxury high-rise  193 
6 story mid-rise  134 




US excl. NY MSA  129 
10<Stories 176 
1. Costs per square foot are from the Marshall & Swift Commercial Cost Estimator.  Values are the average 
of reported costs for building classes A, B, C and D in November 2002. 
2. Cost estimates are from Zaxon, Inc and converted to real 2002 dollars using the CPI. 
3. Reported values are average price per square foot.  Price is reported market value of owner-occupied 
units.  Values are converted to real 2002 dollars using the CPI. 
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Table 5: The Distribution of Estimated Zoning Taxes in Manhattan, 
Annual Flow Cost Estimates for Condominium Owners 








  23,060   7,382   2,927  5,554  9,668 
1.  Source: Condo sales data from First American Real Estate Corporation.  The zoning tax is 
calculated as the cost of capital times the difference between the sales price of a unit and estimated 
construction costs, where the cost of capital equals .03 and constructions costs equal $200/square 
foot times the size of each unit.   49
Table 6: Hedonic Land Prices and Zoning Taxes, 
Select Metropolitan Areas from American Housing Survey Metropolitan Files 
 










Baltimore 1998  $0.88   $154,143 0.018 
Birmingham 1998  $0.13    $114,492  0 
Boston 1998  $0.68    $236,231  0.186 
Chicago 1999 $1.62    $187,669 0.057 
Cincinnati 1999  $0.40   $133,050  0 
Detroit 1999  $0.37    $144,686  0 
Houston 1998 $0.15    $103,505  0 
Los Angeles  1999  $2.59   $260,744  0.339 
Minneapolis 1998  $0.38    $144,719  0 
New York  1999  $1.38   $253,232  0.122 
Newport News (VA)  1998  $0.48   $127,475  0.207 
Oakland 1998 $2.34    $284,443 0.321 
Philadelphia 1999  $0.81    $135,862  0 
Pittsburgh 1998  $0.70   $100,060  0 
Providence 1998  $0.56    $148,059  0 
Rochester 1998  $0.21   $109,050  0 
Salt Lake City  1998  $0.83   $167,541  0.119 
San Francisco  1998  $4.10   $418,890  0.531 
San Jose  1998  $3.92   $385,021  0.469 
Tampa 1998  $0.37    $103,962  0 
Washington, DC  1998  $0.64   $213,281  0.219 
 
Notes:  
1.Hedonic prices of land were estimated using data from 1998 and 1999 metropolitan area surveys of 
the American Housing Survey.  In some cases, areas were over sampled and included in the 1999 
national file of the AHS.  Four hedonic models were estimated.  See the text and footnote 12 for those 
details.  The prices reported here reflect the average of the prices associated with the second and third 
highest estimates across all four specifications (i.e., we discarded the highest and the lowest estimates 
and report the mean of the two remaining estimates). 
2.The house price for each metropolitan area is the mean for the sample of single-unit homes with lot 
sizes less than two acres. 
3.The computation of the zoning tax as a fraction of mean house value is as follows for each area j: 
























Mean House Value and Mean Lot Size are metropolitan area-specific and pertain to the sample of 
single-unit, owner-occupied residences with less than two acres of land.  See the first note for 
more on the hedonic price of land.   50
Figure 1: Housing Permits in Manhattan and Prices 













































 Manhattan permits, units Real housing prices














Source:  Building permits are combined single- and multi-family permits for Manhattan from the US 
Department of Commerce.  Real housing price series is the NY-NJ-LI MSA Consumer Price Index for 
Shelter, deflated by the GDP deflator from the National Income and Product Accounts and rescaled to 
equal 1 in 2002. 
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Source:  Prices are from condo sales records and costs are $200 per square foot.   52
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Change in Real Housing Price (t-1)
















Change in Real Housing Price (t-1)















Source:  Building permits are combined single- and multi-family permits for Manhattan from the US 
Department of Commerce.  Real housing price series is the NY-NJ-LI MSA Consumer Price Index for 
Shelter, deflated by the GDP deflator from the National Income and Product Accounts and rescaled to 
equal 1 in 2002. 